Lecture 09 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis. We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed
average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a mixed strategy is a best response, then all the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be best
responses and hence indifferent. We use this idea to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game within a game of tennis.
(from oyc.yale.edu)
Lecture 09 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
Time
Lecture Chapters
[00:00:00]
1. Mixed Strategies: Definition
[00:06:02]
2. Mixed Strategies: Examples
[00:22:20]
3. Mixed Strategies: Direct and Indirect Effects on the Nash Equilibrium
[00:27:05]
4. Mixed Strategies and the Nash Equilibrium: Example
References
Lecture 9 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
Instructor: Professor Ben Polak. Resources: Problem Set 4 [PDF]; Handout on Mixed Strategies [PDF]; Blackboard Notes Lecture 9 [PDF]. Transcript [html]. Audio [mp3]. Download Video [mov].